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In this article, we analyze the nexus between political regimes and external voting rights.
Using a global longitudinal dataset, we report that higher levels of inclusion and
contestation bring higher probabilities that a state adopts and implements emigrant
enfranchisement. Taking outliers from our quantitative assessment, we then further
examine two liberal democracies, Ireland and Uruguay, and two electoral autocracies,
Turkey and Venezuela. These country cases reveal three mechanisms that shed light on
the strategic role of political elites in explaining the relation between political regime type
and emigrant enfranchisement. First, the democracies under study show us that in certain
contexts with a relatively large diaspora size and in which part of the political spectrum is
hesitant about the political orientation of nonresident citizens, emigrant enfranchisement is
neither necessarily promulgated nor implemented. Second, the autocracies illustrate that
when the diaspora favors (or is perceived to favor) the incumbency, then external voting
rights are extended; otherwise, third, they are withheld or limited for nonresident citizens.
Keywords: political regime, external voting rights, democratization, authoritarianism, emigrant enfranchisement,
democracy
INTRODUCTION
Voting from abroad is broadly conceptualized as a set of procedures that enable nonresident citizens
(emigrants) to partake in home-country elections and possibly stand as candidates (Nohlen and Grotz,
2000; Lafleur, 2013; Collyer, 2014a). It is a common practice globally, with more than 130 autonomous
territories having promulgated emigrant enfranchisement (Allen et al., 2019). However, some
democracies are still reluctant to grant electoral rights to their nonresident populations, whereas
some autocracies bestow generous provisions to their emigrants that politically incorporate them in the
demos. Considering the long-standing scholarly debate on democratization and democratic endurance
from the mid-twentieth century to the present, we ask: to what extent does democracy predict the
timing of the adoption and implementation of emigrant enfranchisement? If it is a main driver, what
explains the deviant cases? In other words, why are some liberal democracies, such as Ireland and
Uruguay, hesitant to enfranchise emigrants, while some electoral autocracies like Turkey and
Venezuela still grant electoral rights to nonresident populations?
Existing literature has produced various explanations associating democratization, democratic
endurance, and norm diffusion to external voting rights. First, the window-of-opportunity
hypothesis—which refers to the crucial moment when countries democratize and, shortly
thereafter, when they typically revamp their legal framework—is a plausible answer for why
states enact, regulate, and apply such a provision of external voting rights (Rhodes and
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Harutyunyan, 2010; Lafleur, 2015; Palop-García and Pedroza,
2019). Second, democratic norms as waves of emulation and
diffusion appear to significantly correlate to emigrant
enfranchisement. This is because globalization, along with
technology and communication, has facilitated disseminating
policies and practices around the world. Ease of
communication allows neighboring countries to exchange
information regarding their institutional experiments on
external voting rights and on other migrant political
transnational practices, such as dual citizenship (Turcu and
Urbatsch, 2015). Third, political competition plays an
increasingly important role in enfranchisement discussions.
This might not only be explained by the fact that external
voting can swing electoral results, but also because political
competition may cause the incumbent and/or opposition
parties to make electoral reforms and regulate external voting
(Brand, 2010; Gamlen, 2015; Turcu and Urbatsch, 2020a;
Wellman, 2020).
Considering previous academic appraisals, our theoretical
argument supports the hypothesis that countries classified as
democracies are more likely to adopt and implement external
voting rights, as compared to autocracies. We disaggregated this
nexus using a four-value variable of political regime and reporting
that liberal and electoral democracy, as well as electoral autocracy,
have a positive impact on emigrant enfranchisement, compared to
closed autocracy. We also examine why some democracies withhold
external voting rights, while some autocracies extend them, for
various strategic state-level motivations. Refining the theoretical
argument of Brand (2010) on autocracies, there are at least two
reasons: 1) the countries enacted external voting rights when they
had previously been democratic and currently prefer to generate
more constraints to voting rather than reversing existing policies,
and/or 2) they merely use external voting for their own benefit. For
democracies that still fail to enact emigrant enfranchisement,
external voting rights are a contested issue for homeland
politicians, since they believe that emigrants’ preferences can flip
electoral results, either against them or in their favor.
Employing a regression-based nested analysis (Rohlfing,
2008), in which we combine a large-N analysis with a carefully
selected set of case studies, we first evaluate whether democracy is
a significant driver to emigrant enfranchisement and then
attempt to determine why and how deviant cases behave
differently. First, to examine if emigrant enfranchisement is
associated with democratic regimes, we use a global
longitudinal dataset (1896–2019) with countries that either
have, or do not have, external voting provisions as of 2020.
Then, we dive deeper into four deviant cases (Ireland, Uruguay,
Turkey, and Venezuela) to elucidate mesolevel mechanisms and
state-led motivations for explaining their rationale of either
granting or withholding external voting rights. Our
conceptualization of external voting rights entails a clear-cut
electoral eligibility of civilians and the rights of casting the
vote from abroad. It thus excludes countries that only allow
diplomatic and military personnel and/or nonresident citizens
who travel during election day to their origin country, whether
subsidized by the political elite (i.e., political parties and leaders)
or willingly, to participate in homeland elections.
This article is structured as follows. First, we briefly discuss the
relation between political regimes and emigrant enfranchisement.
Second, we broadly compare emigrant enfranchisement in
democratic vs. authoritarian regimes. Third, we unpack the
mechanisms in four outliers—two democracies and two
autocracies with counterintuitive outcomes—to examine how
and why they have adopted and implemented external voting
rights or decided to withhold such rights.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Despite most scholarly discussions on full political rights having
traditionally linked them to democratic polity (e.g., López-
Guerra, 2005; Bauböck, 2015; Altman, 2020), emigrant
enfranchisement is also present in authoritarian regimes
(Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Brand, 2010; Collyer, 2014b).
Empirical evidence suggests a probabilistic, rather than
deterministic, logic that assumes democracies depict high
levels of inclusion, whereas autocracies do not.
Relying on seminal contributions of democratic theory (e.g.,
Dahl, 1971; Dahl, 2008; Coppedge, 2012), such a puzzle can be
explained by the necessary and sufficient conditions of being a
democracy or autocracy. Political regimes can be classified by
their levels of competition (or contestation) and participation (or
inclusion) (Dahl, 1971). Whereas contestation refers to the
procedures of political competition in free and fair elections,
participation is mainly concerned with who partakes in the
democratic decision-making process. Not every autocracy
FIGURE 1 | Political regime vs. external voting rights. Source: authors’ own elaboration based on Regimes of the World–the RoW measure (D) (v2x_regime) (see
Lührmann et al., 2018).
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displays low inclusion, but, normatively, democracies should
depict high degrees of both participation and competition
(Clark et al., 2017).
Based on these scope conditions, four different types of
political regimes can be classified: liberal democracy, electoral
democracy, electoral autocracy, and closed autocracy (Lührmann
et al., 2018). Liberal democracy is the regime most akin to Dahl’s
polyarchy, in which the rule of law and liberal principles are
satisfied and the degrees of participation and competition are
high. Electoral democracy displays high levels of inclusion and
contestation but lacks some aspects of the rule of law and liberal
principles. In an electoral autocracy, there is only one effective
party, or the field of political competition is uneven despite de jure
multiparty elections. Lastly, closed autocracies comprise all
political regimes where neither de jure nor de facto
competitive elections occur. Political inclusion can be high
even in these cases, yet closed autocracies systematically
violate liberal principles and rule of law (Lührmann et al.,
2018), likely alongside also violating the political and civil
rights of nonresident citizens.
Figure 1 shows a four-category relation between nonresident
citizens’ electoral inclusion and political regimes. It illustrates the
different types of political regimes in circles and three lines
indicating the following: (A) transitioning from one regime to
another; (B) the window-of-opportunity hypothesis; and (C) the
assumption that the odds of electoral inclusion for nonresident
citizens is more likely to occur in a liberal democracy than in a
closed autocracy.
Relying on the existing literature of regime transition and
consolidation (e.g., Linz and Stepan, 1996; Bratton and Van de
Walle, 1997), the continuum between democracy and
authoritarianism may present different instances for emigrant
enfranchisement. Preceding studies about the relation between
democratization and external voting rights have been largely
interested in a unidirectional conjecture (represented as a
dashed line in Figure 1). As the window-of-opportunity
hypothesis suggests, democratization is conducive to enlarging
citizenship rights (Ramirez et al., 1997). It assumes that
nonresident citizens—analogous to other historically
marginalized collectives (e.g., women and ethnic minorities)
excluded from franchise—may profit from a democratization
process (Foweraker and Landman, 1999; Lafleur, 2015).
Drawing on this assumption, Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010)
hypothesize that political competition encourages countries to
enact external voting rights since it enables more actors to impact
the policy-making process. In that sense, nonresident citizens’
demands for voting rights are more prone to be heard in the
domestic realm and supported by homeland political parties
willing to capture overseas votes (Gamlen, 2015; Østergaard-
Nielsen et al., 2019; Burgess, 2020).
Considering the association between democratic norms and
countries that have adopted and implemented external voting
rights, scholars have further indicated the relevant role of
democratization (e.g., Lafleur, 2015; Palop-García and Pedroza,
2019). Using the window-of-opportunity hypothesis, Rhodes and
Harutyunyan (2010) correlate whether periods of democratic
transitions establish a unique opportunity for creating several
policies, such as dual citizenship and external voting. Although
they found no significance in their quantitative assessment
regarding the extension of emigrant enfranchisement, they
highlight that democratic transitions are key in explaining the
extension of citizenship regimes to nonresident citizens.
The window-of-opportunity hypothesis was particularly relevant
in the Global South at the beginning of the third wave of
democratization. In Latin America, various authors suggest that
the quality of democratic institutions affected enfranchisement
processes, including extending suffrage rights to migrants (e.g.,
Escobar, 2015; Finn, 2020). The same holds true in Middle
Eastern and North African countries as well as Sub-Saharan
Africa (e.g., Lafleur, 2015; Wellman, 2020). Overall, holding
multiparty elections is a strong determinant for enacting and
implementing emigrant enfranchisement in the Global South
(Escobar, 2015; Palop-García and Pedroza, 2019; Wellman, 2020).
Moreover, comparative political and international relations’
studies have examined the democratic norms’ hypothesis since
the seminal work of Huntington (1991) on the third wave of
democratization. International and regional norms’ diffusion
occurs when states replicate other governments’ decision-
making (Elkins and Simmons, 2005). This hypothesis is likely
to spread across borders, such as through waves of emulation and
diffusion (Turcu and Urbatsch, 2015). Neighboring countries are
the main responsible actors in emulating such norms, given their
fairly high and mutual information flows (Kopstein and Reilly,
2000). When country A has experimented with innovative
policies that function well, neighboring country B may actively
promulgate similar policies to resolve domestic challenges
(Cortell and Davis, 1996; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). States
must have a ‘good’ or ‘positive’ perception of the countries
they mimic, particularly when the policies have not been
conclusively proven before. As such, this hypothesis works as
a social process within adjacent geographic locations over time
(Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Turcu and Urbatsch, 2015).
Alongside this neighboring diffusion effect, scholars have also
emphasized the role of nonresident nationals and noncitizen
residents as agents of democratic norms diffusion (Pérez-
Armendariz and Crow, 2010; Turcu and Urbatsch, 2015).
Experiences of Latin American emigrants in the United States,
for instance, suggest that enactment and implementation
occurred from origin countries not only due to encouragement
of their political elite, but also bottom-up demand for dual
citizenship and external voting rights (Jones-Correa, 1998;
Lafleur, 2013). As such, emigrants themselves became agents
of democratization (Escobar, 2017).
Likewise, extending external voting rights to nonresident
populations also lies within existing literature on electoral
preferences, particularly the burgeoning literature on the
voting alignment of citizens residing abroad (e.g., Verdery,
1998; Turcu and Urbatsch, 2020a). A growing number of
contributions have explained the increasing interest of ruling
parties and coalitions in enfranchising nonresident
citizens—again, similar to their interest in other excluded
minority groups throughout history—given their strategic
calculations (e.g., Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019; Umpierrez
de Reguero and Dandoy, 2020; Wellman, 2020). This logic
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relies largely on two theoretical arguments: 1) electoral reform
will only occur if ruling parties or a coalition is willing to
incorporate new actors into the political game (Boix, 1999) or
2) as a coercion tactic in which incumbent parties or coalitions
seek to deter potential challengers from opposition parties
(Geddes, 2005; Magaloni, 2006; Simpser, 2013). While the first
argument most likely relates to a democratic context, the second
is inherently associated with the de facto hegemonic nature of
party systems (Wellman, 2020). By assuming that incumbent
parties or coalitions will grant suffrage rights to nonresident
citizens, these arguments lead homeland politicians to pursue a
new niche of potential voters to support them.
So, which political parties support external voting rights andwhy?
In Latin America, emigrants’ political rights were mostly promoted
by right-leaning parties, under the influence of ‘strongmen’ in power
prior to the 1990s (Escobar, 2015). Yet, the ascension of outsiders
into politics—e.g., Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Rafael Correa
(Ecuador), and Evo Morales (Bolivia), as well as being associated
with an inclusionary radical populism—has been accompanied by
the adoption and implementation of external voting provisions that
lean toward left-wing actors (Bermúdez et al., 2017; Erlingsson and
Tuman, 2017; Umpierrez de Reguero et al., 2020). In Sub-Saharan
Africa, the opposition parties, probably driven by a rational-choice
estimation, often support emigrant enfranchisement given the
aversion that incumbent parties can generate from the diaspora
related to “domestic discontent, lack of opportunities, and conflicts”
(Wellman, 2020, p. 3). In Europe, external voting rights are often
correlated with mainstream right-wing parties (Østergaard-Nielsen
et al., 2019). For example, in Italy, the National Alliance is associated
with the evolution of emigrant enfranchisement and paying
attention to emigrants’ wellbeing (Lafleur, 2013). In France and
Spain, citizenship reforms, in particular the rights of nonresident
citizens, have been endorsed by mainstream right-leaning parties
(Joppke, 2003).
Beyond the left-right axis of party politics, it seems that
nonresident citizens are more prone to vote for green parties
as compared to domestic voters (Turcu and Urbatsch, 2020b).
Overall, many homeland parties are highly interested in
campaigning across borders (Paarlberg, 2017; Østergaard-
Nielsen and Ciornei, 2019; Burgess, 2020; Jakobson et al.,
2020; Kernalegenn and Van Haute, 2020; Rashkova, 2020;
Camatarri, 2021; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy, 2021).
As effective political competition is a substantial aspect for
detecting a mutually exclusive classification between
democracy and authoritarianism, we pose a fruitful debate of
party politics in Small-N: Unpacking the Political Regime-
Emigrant Enfranchisement Relation to answer how and why
some political regimes present counterintuitive results on
emigrant enfranchisement.
LARGE-N ANALYSIS: IS DEMOCRACY
CONDUCTIVE TO EMIGRANT
ENFRANCHISEMENT?
In order to answer if democracies or autocracies are more likely to
enfranchise nonresident citizens, we constructed a cross-national
dataset, which includes information for 158 countries from 1896
to 2019 (N  16,289). In other words, our unit of analysis is
country year. In our dataset, Norway was the first country to enact
external voting rights for some civilians (i.e., not only for
diplomatic and military personnel) in 1896 (Saby, 1918), so
we take this year as the starting point in our assessment. If a
country was established later than this time, we adhere
observations to our dataset the same year they obtained
formal recognition as a sovereign territory, as recognized by
most states and international organizations. For instance, we
incorporated Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovakia in 1992 and 1993,
respectively. Given the complex search for accurate emigrant
electoral rights in some contexts (e.g., authoritarian regimes and
when the documents verifying the emigrant enfranchisement
stages are not publicly available), our sample numbers 158
origin countries (see Supplementary Table S1).
Our dataset relies on primary and secondary sources. We
corroborated each observation on the enactment and first
application of emigrant enfranchisement from online archives
and existing official documents from electoral commissions and
ministries of interior about electoral processes abroad. We also
gathered dataset observations by consulting reputable indexes
such as the Regimes of the World (RoW), the measure from the
Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM, Coppedge et al., 2020) project,
and the Electoral Laws Indicators (ELECLAW) from the Global
Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT, Schmidt et al., 2019). In
addition, we consulted supplementary data in academic
references (e.g., Escobar, 2017; Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019;
Wellman, 2020) to enrich our dataset.
Measures
Similar to recent relevant contributions (e.g., Lafleur, 2013;
Palop-García and Pedroza, 2019; Wellman, 2020), we
operationalized emigrant enfranchisement as a two-stage
process. The first involves enacting external voting rights, or
de jure emigrant enfranchisement. This can be verified, for
example, in an electoral code, constitution, executive/royal
decree, or other official legal documents. Although the second
stage could be considered regulation of the law to organize
electoral voting rights (such as in Palop-García and Pedroza,
2019), we opted for a more parsimonious operationalization
comprising implementation, or de facto emigrant
enfranchisement, which is the first time that the nonresident
population votes in home-country elections. As such, we can
distinguish the countries that have failed to implement emigrant
enfranchisement despite having promulgated it in their legal
framework; the distinction also caters to further analyses
considering nonresident citizens’ voter turnout and policy
reversals (e.g., Brand, 2006; Wellman, 2020). De jure and de
facto emigrant enfranchisement serve as our dependent variables.
Despite the variety of methods in which external voting rights
can be enacted and implemented (e.g., Lafleur, 2013; Collyer,
2014a; Hutcheson and Arrighi, 2015; Schmid et al., 2019), our
conceptualization excludes a restrictive eligibility. For instance, if
a country only allows certain categories of citizens belonging to
the demos (e.g., diplomatic and military personnel) or if
nonresident citizens are required to travel during election day
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to their origin country to participate in homeland elections, either
independently or sponsored by political elites, we code it as “0”
for absence of emigrant enfranchisement.
Following Lührmann and colleagues’ (2018) classification, we
operationalized political regimes as a four-value ordinal
independent variable, coding “closed autocracy” as “0,”
“electoral autocracy” as “1,” “electoral democracy” as “2,” and
“liberal democracy” as “3.”Accordingly, we identify in which type
of political regime emigrant enfranchisement is most likely to be
present or had emerged. We also include two V-Dem indexes
(Liberal Democracy and Electoral Democracy) for robustness
checks.
We control our models by incorporating two dummy
variables: whether the country belongs to the European Union
(EU) or the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Following Rhodes and Harutyunyan
FIGURE 2 | Hazard ratios, de jure emigrant enfranchisement vs. political regimes.
FIGURE 3 | Hazard ratios, de facto emigrant enfranchisement vs. political regimes.
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(2010), we use economic development as controls. Alongside the
fact that most democracies around the globe pertain to those
institutional clusters (therefore, we expect that being a member of
either organization positively correlates to external voting rights),
we add the variables EU and OECD because de facto emigrant
enfranchisement in particular requires considerable fiscal and
bureaucratic resources, which are more copious with higher levels
of development.
Estimation Strategy
As other studies related to migrant voting rights (e.g., Turcu and
Urbatsch, 2015; Kayran and Erdilmen, 2020), we use proportional
survival models to estimate the relation between political regime
and the timing of emigrant enfranchisement. Proportional
survival analyses are also well known as event history
statistical models. We selected the Cox Proportional Hazard
Model as the core method over a binary or ordinal logistic
regression in our analysis, given the flexibility of measuring a
set of events over time. We also incorporate a set of ordinal
logistic regressions, adding controls to isolate the temporal factor,
as robustness checks (see Supplementary Table S2). Employing a
Cox Proportional Hazard model, we are interested in examining
the extent to which democracy predicts the timing of the
adoption and implementation of emigrant enfranchisement.
The main goal of this method is to generate hazard ratios h(t|
x) that represent the risk of shifting from one country to another,
which for our purpose means shifting from the absence of
emigrant enfranchisement (i.e., “0”) to enactment (de jure
enfranchisement “1”) and/or first application (de facto
enfranchisement “1”) of external voting rights, due to their
absence up to time t. We calculate the covariates x on whether
they predict the timing of emigrant enfranchisement within our
sample of 158 countries.
Findings
Our models are highly significant (global p-value [Log-Rank] <
0,001) and the Concordance indexes oscillate from 0.64 to 0.86,
which are the habitual results when Cox Proportional Hazard
Ratios satisfactorily fit. Additionally, each model passed the
linktest diagnostic for misspecification.
Figure 2 shows that de jure emigrant enfranchisement
positively correlates to democracy. As expected, higher levels
of inclusion and contestation, along with higher indicators in
terms of rule of law and liberal principles, result in higher odds of
enacting external voting rights. We find liberal democracies are
around four times more likely to enact voting rights for
nonresident citizens (HR 4.2; p-value < 0.001), as compared
to closed autocracies. Similarly, electoral democracies are three
times more likely to extend suffrage rights to their population
living abroad (HR 3.0; p-value < 0.001). Electoral autocracies are
also positively correlated with de jure emigrant enfranchisement,
more than twice as likely as compared to closed autocracies (HR
2.3; p-value < 0.001). This is unsurprising since most closed
autocracies such as North Korea and Saudi Arabia do not hold
elections. A few exceptions appear, such as Algeria under the
command of Houari Boumédiène (1965–1978), which passed a
modest external voting rights provision in the 1976 Constitution
(Brand, 2010).
Figure 3 complements our previous results by showing the
timing of de facto emigrant enfranchisement. Again, all types of
political regimes are significant. Similar to our first model in
which democracy was conducive to de jure emigrant
enfranchisement, Figure 3 shows that liberal democracies are
about eight times more likely to implement an external voting
provision (HR 8.3; p-value < 0.001) and more than five times
more likely if the country is classified as an electoral democracy
(HR 5.2; p-value < 0.001). Although probabilities are reduced if
the country is an electoral autocracy (HR 3.2; p-value < 0.001), it
still represents a robust positive correlation to de facto emigrant
enfranchisement. As in Model 1, closed autocracy is the reference
category. Overall, most countries classified as autocracies display
a negative outcome or ‘0’, when referring to implementing
external voting rights, regardless of whether they had
previously passed a provision to enfranchise their nonresident
citizens. Certain countries, such as Angola and Nicaragua,
promulgated provisions to organize external voting decades
ago, but have not implemented corresponding legislation (Ellis
et al., 2007; Palop-García and Pedroza, 2019).
Four Cox Proportional Hazard Models ensured our results
remain the same when including another measurement of
democracy. Table 1 demonstrates that the probabilities of
positive correlation between democracy and emigrant
enfranchisement remain high. Adding two dummy variables as
controls, we corroborate that a democratic regime is a strong
predictor of both enacting and implementing external voting
rights. Similarly, belonging to both the EU and OECD increases
TABLE 1 | Hazard ratios, emigrant enfranchisement vs. political regimes.
De jure emigrant enfranchisement De facto emigrant enfranchisement
M1 M2 M3 M4
Liberal democracy (Index VDEM) 4.92*** 4.47***
Electoral democracy (Index VDEM) 5.08*** 4.40***
EU — 0.77*** — 0.87***
OECD 0.82*** — 0.92*** —
Concordance index 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.86
(se  0.004) (se  0.003) (se  0.004) (se  0.003)
Likelihood ratio test 2059*** 2,691*** 2072*** 2,407***
Score (LogRank) test 1931*** 2,549*** 1936*** 2,287 ***
Nagelkerke 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.14
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the odds for origin states to undertake de jure and de facto
emigrant enfranchisement. So, how and why do some
democracies choose not to pass and/or implement external
voting rights, while some autocracies do?
SMALL-N: UNPACKING THE POLITICAL
REGIME-EMIGRANT ENFRANCHISEMENT
RELATION
In this section, we aim to shed light on how different mesolevel
mechanisms and state-led motivations help explain why some
political regimes are deviant cases for the above-indicated results.
We dive into the strategic role of political elites that lie behind
country-case outliers. We use most-different cases since “most
different cases that are broadly representative of the population
will provide the strongest basis for generalization” (Seawright and
Gerring, 2008, p. 298). On one side, we briefly analyze the current
debates on emigrant enfranchisement of Ireland and Uruguay (both
democracies) and specifically why they fail to enact and/or
implement a provision for granting suffrage rights to nonresident
citizens. On the other side, we examine de jure and de facto emigrant
enfranchisement in Turkey andVenezuela, two electoral autocracies.
Although closed autocracies can also enact and/or implement
external voting rights, we focus on electoral autocracies due to
their higher probability to do so (see Findings; Supplementary
Table S3). Emigrant enfranchisement has already been
intensively explored in closed autocracies, such as in Algeria and
Morocco (see Brand, 2010).
Being outliers of the nexus between political regime and
external voting rights, Ireland, Uruguay, Turkey, and
Venezuela provide us diversity in terms of political context,
economic development, and culture. For decades, Ireland and
Turkey have ranked among the top twenty of the highest
migration outflows worldwide (Abadan-Unat, 2011; Honohan,
2011). Currently, Venezuela is the biggest sending country in
South America (Acosta et al., 2019). Meanwhile, Uruguay has a
significant share of its population abroad (Margheritis, 2017;
Altman, 2020). Therefore, the four country cases allow us to
unpack mechanisms for their counterintuitive behavior (see
Table 2)—namely, to explain their deviant outcomes.
Troubles in Paradise? Democracies That
Withhold External Voting Rights
Since changing institutions in democracies is not as easy as in
autocracies (Geddes, 2005), the Irish and Uruguayan cases
show a set of institutional-political obstacles and setbacks for
emigrant enfranchisement. Overall, both liberal democracies
contain rather cautious political elites with regard to extending
nonresident citizens’ electoral rights, and there has been more
than a single attempt to invite resident nationals to decide this
issue via mechanisms of direct democracy. While Irish
authorities have delayed the referendum twice on citizens
living outside the state to vote in presidential elections,
Uruguayans residing within the country denied voting
rights to nonresident citizens in the 2009 Referendum. Over
the last decade, both countries introduced law proposals in
their respective parliaments. Whereas Irish authorities are still
waiting for the final approval of public opinion, as of the end of
2020, the most recent attempt for nonresident Uruguayan to
vote in homeland elections was declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court of Justice.
Beyond delays and mechanisms that promote external voting
rights, it seems that de jure emigrant enfranchisement in Ireland
and Uruguay must also manage to find a fitting solution to satisfy
a wide majority of political sectors and public opinion. Indeed,
political elites in both democracies are exceptionally concerned
about certain circumstances, such as the diaspora size, as well as
the political background of the country directly associated with
migration outflows.
In Ireland, parliamentary debates have arisen starting in 1991
when the Labor Party Bill posed a tentative pathway to enable
Irish citizens living abroad for less than 15 years to partake in
homeland elections. In the same decade, a proposal with the
endorsement of the then President, Mary Robinson, suggested
three senatorial seats for nonresident Irish’s direct representation
(Honohan, 2011). In 2002, the All-Party Committee claimed that
the right to vote in elections for the lower chamber (Dáil Éireann)
should remain restricted to nationals residing within the state,
while recommending that the office of the Prime Minister should
designate senators ‘with an awareness of emigrant issues’
(Government of Ireland, 2002: 59). In 2009, another proposal
was outlined, this time to consider the viability of presidential
elections for nonresident Irish (Honohan, 2011). A decade later,
for the 2016 general election, political parties such as Fianna Fáil
and Fine Gael showed a favorable perspective toward a
referendum for granting external voting rights, both in their
party manifestos and public speeches. In 2019, two instances of
holding a referendum were halted by external events such as
Brexit. Regardless, another bill endorsed by the cabinet was
introduced in the lower chamber to extend the voting
franchise to nonresident citizens for the presidential election
on September 16, 2019.
TABLE 2 | Case selection.




Ireland Yes No No
Uruguay Yes No No
Turkey No Yes Yes
Venezuela No Yes Yes
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Despite the Constitution (Art. 2) proclaiming that “the Irish nation
cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad
who share its cultural identity and heritage”, the same normativity
limited political membership to citizenship as nationality. Thus, the
current bill has only included the first generation, who are passport
holders, with the prospect of return. Thereby, it automatically
excluded about 70 million people worldwide who self-identify as
Irish. Irish authorities have discussed the exclusion, alongside having a
direct district, as a way of lowering the probability of swinging
elections due to the high expected electoral weight of nonresident
citizens (Honohan, 2011).
In the second case of liberal democracy withholding external voting
rights, proposals to grant such rights to nonresident Uruguayans were
debated in Parliament and the public sphere several times (Margheritis,
2017). In 2007, a law project to bestow this franchise was voted in the
parliament, led by the then ruling coalition Broad Front (Frente
Amplio). Similar to Ireland, the verdict was subject to a national
referendum and public opinion blocked the political initiative in 2009
(around 37% of resident nationals voted in favor of external voting
rights, which was below the electoral threshold required to amend the
Constitution). Prior to the 2014 presidential elections, Uruguayan
authorities made another attempt to incorporate nonresident
citizens in the demos. Yet, after a long inter-institutional exchange
between the Migration National Junta, which is a public institution in
charge ofmigration issues, and the presidential office, the project failed.
A new proposal was outlined in 2015 but laid dormant in the
Uruguayan Parliament (Margheritis, 2017). Owing to the
leadership of the Broad Front, in 2018, Law 19.654 passed,
which provided a route for the estimated 10.7% of
Uruguayans who reside abroad to vote in homeland elections
(Altman, 2020); it also created an electoral commission to lead
regulation in the near future (Carreño, 2020). However, this legal
resource was rapidly impugned by the Colorado Party,
Independent Party, National Party, and People’s Party. In
2020, the Supreme Court of Justice declared that Law 19.654
was unconstitutional by a unanimous decision (Carreño, 2020).
As of the end of 2020, Uruguay was one of only two countries in
South America, along with Suriname, that has failed to provide de
jure emigrant enfranchisement.
In sum, the democracies under analysis, Ireland and Uruguay,
demonstrate two constraints for extending de jure or de facto
emigrant enfranchisement: the diaspora size matters, as do
political elite who are hesitant about unknown nonresident
citizens’ political preferences. Indeed, political parties and
resident citizens might feel no need to modify their status quo
and grant nonresident citizen voting.
Emigrant Enfranchisement in Electoral
Autocracies
Considering that changing institutions in autocracies depends on
the willingness of the ultimate decision unit (Geddes, 2005), we
study the Turkish and Venezuelan cases to illustrate the other side
of the coin: the presence of emigrant enfranchisement in electoral
autocracies, when voting from abroad is enacted and regularly
applied. We introduce two mechanisms. In Turkey, external
voting rights depict political elite engaged with the diaspora.
In Venezuela, however, the two are separate yet not politically
divorced, due to the high costs involved in repealing them.
Generous External Voting Rights in Turkey: When the
Incumbent Is Favored
The Turkish 1980military coup, and the resulting 1982 Constitution,
witnessed the first steps of recognizing eligible nonresident Turkish
citizens as a new electoral niche that could democratically be
perceived as a method of inclusiveness. The 1980s also established
a legal restriction on parties’ representation by introducing a
nationwide threshold of 10%, which, to this day, stands as the
most significant constraint to Turkey’s effective multiparty system.
Since the 1987 elections, eligible nonresident citizens have been able
to cast ballots at Turkish border crossings for legislative elections. Yet
the border-crossing ballots for the 1987 election and the following
seven elections1 proved that the overseas votes did not affect the
electoral results.2 As such, recognizing nonresident citizens as voters
was symbolic, in part to encourage remittance inflows rather than a
step toward a more inclusive democracy (Icduygu et al., 2001).
From the over two-decade experience of border crossing voting,
external voters’ political orientation has traditionally tended to
support conservative right-wing parties over center-right or left-
wing parties [Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey YSK, (2020)].
Beyond the authoritarian legacy prominent across decades in Turkey,
it is worthwhile to stress that the economically motivated lower
educated groups, in the 1960s and 1970s from rural Anatolian
heartlands, started emigrating to Europe through guest worker
agreements. Having overall low levels of education and without
professional backgrounds, they first emigrated to Germany and
subsequently to France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and
Sweden (Avcı and Kirisci, 2006). These factors contributed to the
conservative orientation of their vote and, given further flows through
networks of cultures of migration, such political alignment continued
to grow (Sirkeci et al., 2012). This is not surprising to the burgeoning
literature of migrant and nonmigrant voting alignment (e.g., Turcu
and Urbatsch, 2020a; Wellman, 2020).
From the 1970s onwards, Turkish labor emigration to Western
European countries declined due to the oil crisis and the European
countries’ saturation. The political turmoil of 1980s and 1990s in
Turkey created political refugees that became the main source of the
emigration wave (Fassmann and Munz, 1992; Østergaard-Nielsen,
2003; Sirkeci, 2005). These newer emigre groups fromTurkey did not
outnumber the economically motivated migrants, making the
average sociopolitical demography of the diaspora largely
conservative, despite increased voice of the opposition groups who
were consisting of leftists, mostly ethnic minority Kurds and not
officially recognized religious minority Alevis in guest worker
residence countries (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Sirkeci, 2005;
Yener-Roderburg, 2020).
1The elections in which eligible nonresident citizens could only vote at border
crossings were the 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, and 2011 legislative
elections.
2The 2007 legislative election is an exception. An independent candidate of the pro-
Kurdish bloc candidate lost the election once the votes cast by expats came from the
border crossings and were allocated to the Hakkari district by falling behind the
AKP candidate.
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Since the second election that the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) won in 2007, the party emerged
as the successor of the banned conservative parties Welfare Party
(Refah Partisi) and Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi). Unsurprisingly,
nonresident voters have shown greater support for AKP than
resident voters in the guest worker resident countries, whereas in
destinations where the migration is dominated by political ethnic
and religious insecurities, such as in the United Kingdom and
Sweden, political balance has been tilted toward pro-minority
party Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi,
HDP) (YSK, 2020). Therefore, despite legislation that enabled
enfranchising voters abroad pass and was supported by both the
ruling party, the AKP, and opposition parties (Minutes of the Grand
National Assembly of Turkey, 2008; Official Gazette of Turkey
26824, 2008a), the chronological significance of enabling external
voting rights under the AKP’s rule from the 2014 Presidential
Elections onwards can hardly be seen as a coincidence (Turcu
and Urbatsch, 2020a). Regardless, the grounds for enabling
emigrant enfranchisement cannot be solely attributed to
nonresident support for the incumbent party. Taking the
counterfactual, perhaps the AKP would have played such a major
role in passing the law, if the party had not received the largest share
from the border crossings’ ballot boxes (see the Venezuelan case
below).
The 2014 Presidential Elections were the first in which
nonresident citizens could vote from their residence country
under certain conditions (see Table 3). Despite receiving the
highest support for the AKP’s presidential candidate, nonresident
citizens’ voter turnout was lower than expected but still indicated
higher support overall for the AKP (Abadan-Unat et al., 2014).
Therefore, the AKP rapidly addressed the main obstacles3 that
previously appeared to be related to the implementation process.
The changes to implementation, imposed to facilitate external
voting4 with each election held after 2014, translated into higher
voter turnout, evident from consecutive election results (see
Table 4).5 However, the difficulties of getting to the polling
TABLE 3 | Electoral inclusiveness of nonresident Turkish voters (2014–2018).




Level of election Mono level (only at the national level)




aAccording to the Election Law, to set up a polling station in a country requires at least 500 registered citizens. Countries that have fewer than 500 registered Turkish nationals in their
electoral rolls are exempt from enforcement (see Turkish Constitution Act no. 4320 and Act no. 1570).
bTo be eligible for voting at an extraterritorial polling station, nonresident citizens have to reside abroad for six month or longer and are required to be registered at their country of residence
(see Turkish Constitution Article no. 94).
TABLE 4 | Easiness to vote in Turkey (2014–2018).












Valid Turkish ID or Turkish passport
Length of voting at the
overseas polling stationsa
(# days)
1–4 1–24 1–18 1–14 1–13 1–5
Precondition for voting
(if eligible)
Once by post or in-person registration at a
diplomatic mission, and making an
appointment within the polling schedule
Once by post or in-person registration at a diplomatic mission
# Of countries/polling
stations
54/103 54/112 54/113 57/NA 60/123 60/123
Voting method In-person (at a designated polling station) In-person (at any extraterritorial
polling station)
Source: YSK (2020).
aThe YSK holds discretionary rights to determine the polling length.
3Including electoral roll registration requirement, appointment requirement to
vote at a designated polling station at a country of residence, the geographical
proximity of the polling stations to the voters’ residents.
4Such as withdrawing the appointment system, extending the voting period,
increasing the number of polling stations, and permitting eligible expats to vote
at any extraterritorial polling station in addition to border crossings.
5There are no certain data on the number of people with a Turkish background; yet
according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs around six million Turkish
people are living overseas, and according to the last elections that were held in 2018
over three million are qualified to vote for the Turkish legislative and presidential
elections and referenda.
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station did not have an inclusive solution in practice. Despite the
2008 amendment to make postal voting possible, in-person
voting has remained the only method of casting a ballot
(Official Gazette of Turkey 26927, 2008b, July 05, 2008). In
parallel, the AKP promoted voting by introducing a highly
active and systematic mobilization engagement with the AKP’s
sympathizers, via the AKP’s overseas satellites and pro-AKP
diaspora rallies held in major European cities (Burgess, 2020;
Yener-Roderburg, 2020).
As indicated, the AKP has benefited greatly from nonresident
voters, particularly labor migrants. This included launching its
overseas mobilization efforts as part of its new diaspora policy,
as soon as it acquired the power as ruling party in 2002 via the
party’s overseas satellites, such as the lobbying institution
International Democrats (Uluslararası Demokratlar Birliği, UID),
state institutions including the Turkish missions abroad, the Office
for the Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler
ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, YTB), and other organizations
including the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet
İşleri Türk İslam Birliği, DITIB) (Adamson, 2018; Sahin Mencutek
and Baser, 2018; Yanasmayan and Kaşlı, 2019; Arkilic, 2020). The
activities of these organizations included but were not limited to
reaching out to the addresses of the electorates, canvassing and
registering the DITIB members to the electoral role, and most
significantly providing free regular shuttle bus services to vote
(Yener-Roderburg 2020).
The shuttle bus service transported party supporters from
short- and long-distance locations to polling stations and
provided supplementary food, which largely eliminated the in-
person voting hardships for AKP sympathizers. While the in-
person voting method might equate to a negative determinant
factor for some Turkish voters abroad, one AKP supporters
among our respondents (Supplementary Table S4) did not
indicate any discomfort with it. He asserted: “I am not
bothered that I needed to travel 200 km [Konstanz to
Karlsruhe, Germany] to vote; my party has picked me up
from my home door and dropped me back off. I have not
spent even a cent” (TR1), whereas another respondent who
openly supported the main opposition party, the Republican
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), remarked, “I
called the shuttle bus service of the AKP and because I could not
give a reference name that would show that I am an AKP
supporter, they did not sign me up for the shuttle list” (TR2).
Other competing party supporters tried to offer other
transportation services, but the efforts of the party supporters
remained scarce and lacked centralization. The extensive
mobilization efforts in providing shuttle buses stand out as
one of the critical reasons why the AKP’s vote share has
TABLE 5 | Party fragmentation in Turkey.
Abroad
ENPC/ENPP Fragmentation Concentration First preference Second preference Turnouta
Presidential 2014 2.14 0.53 89.50 Recep tayip erdoğan (AKP) Ekmeleddin mehmet İhsanoğlu (CHP) 8.37%
Parliamentary 2015a 3.00 0.67 71.80 AKP HDP 32.03%
Parliamentary 2015b 2.61 0.62 75.55 AKP HDP 40.03%
Presidential 2018 2.29 0.56 84.77 Recep tayip erdoğan (AKP) Muharrem İnce (CHP) 44.05%
Parliamentary 2018 2.97 0.66 69.48 AKP CHP 49.45%
Inland
ENPC/ENPP Fragmentation Concentration First preference Second preference Turnout
Presidential 2014 2.33 0.57 90.75 Recep tayip erdoğan (AKP) Ekmeleddin mehmet İhsanoğlu (CHP) 79.39%
Parliamentary 2015a 3.66 0.73 65.79 AKP CHP 83.96%
Parliamentary 2015b 2.99 0.67 74.88 AKP CHP 86.63%
Presidential 2018 2.64 0.62 82.89 Recep tayip erdoğan (AKP) Muharrem İnce (CHP) 86.51%
Parliamentary 2018 3.75 0.73 65.07 AKP CHP 86.34%
Source: YSK (2020).
aWe divided the total overseas votes by the total valid votes of all national jurisdictions.
TABLE 6 | Voter turnout in Venezuela, percentage abroad and inland.





PSUV CR, NT, JP
% (abroad) % (inland) Difference % (abroad) % (inland) Difference
Presidential 2000 25.91 56.97 −31.07 70.32 35.71 34.61 0.12%
Presidential 2006 24.47 62.96 −38.49 75.37 36.80 38.58 0.29%
Presidential 2012 8.45 55.33 −46.87 90.54 44.52 46.02 0.45%
Presidential 2013 7.43 50.79 −43.36 92.48 48.95 43.53 0.40%
Source: CNE (2020).
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increased more in every succeeding election, as compared to
competing parties (see Table 5).
Although party fragmentation increased in Turkey over
time, abroad the reality approximates to a bipartisan system
(see Table 5). Furthermore, the share of overseas votes over
the inland votes has increased each election. Given the
imbalanced vote share of the parties, particularly of the
AKP and Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik
Partisi, HDP) within the country and abroad, this scenario has
changed the overall electoral balance. In the June 2015 and
2018 elections, respectively two and then one legislative seats
shifted to the AKP, whereas only one seat changed to the HDP
in the former election and the following elections did not
swing votes in HDP’s favor. As the diaspora favors the AKP,
this country case shows us one mechanism why external
voting rights are implemented: as a strategy to benefit the
incumbent.
Restricting Emigrant Enfranchisement in Venezuela:
When the Incumbent is Challenged
InVenezuela, de jure emigrant enfranchisement was adopted in 1993,
under the right-wing government led by the former President Rafael
Caldera (founder of the National Convergence Party). To a large
extent, enactment occurred as a result of pressure from nonresident
Venezuelans (Escobar, 2015). Yet, political elites demonstrated their
unwillingness to regulate and apply external voting rights until
1998–1999 in the first presidential term of Hugo Chávez,
recurrently classified as an inclusionary radical populist (e.g., by
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). In 1999, less than 4,000
nonresident Venezuelans participated in two referenda: one to
support or reject the necessity of a new constitution and another
to approve a constitutional draft. In these elections, emigrant
enfranchisement for nonresident Venezuelans was both
promulgated and implemented in the Constitution of 2000
(Escobar, 2017; Umpierrez de Reguero et al., 2020).
After this constitutional reform, Chávez was reelected with
more than 55% of the inland votes, yet Venezuelans living abroad
were not electorally aligned (see Table 6). Chávez obtained only
about 25% of the overseas votes, as Venezuelans residing abroad
favored the then opposition candidate, Francisco Arias Cardenas
from the Radical Cause (Causa Radical, CR). Prior to the 2006
presidential election, Chávez and his party, the United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela,
PSUV), introduced an amendment to the Electoral Law to
restrict external voting rights’ access and eligibility. This
amendment provided that Venezuelans residing abroad needed
a valid residence permit (visa) from their residence country in
their passports. This immediately excluded dual citizens from
voting in homeland elections (Bello, 2018).
While the dominance of the ruling party gradually increased
within Venezuela, the electoral register of overseas voters
remained almost the same over time and their votes
increasingly favored the opposition (see Table 6), both in
presidential elections and referenda. For instance, in 2013
around 92.5% of nonresident Venezuelans voted for Henrique
Capriles from the First Justice party (Justicia Primero, JP). Yet,
there is evidence of Venezuelans residing in autocracies such as
Cuba showing overwhelming support for the ruling preelectoral
coalition in every election they could participate in between 1999
and 2018 (CNE, 2020). This can be easily explained by the regime
commonalties shared by the Cuban and Venezuelan political
environments, as well as their proactive bilateral relations.
After former president Chávez’s death, the then vice-president
Nicolás Maduro ascended into power until presidential elections
in late 2013. Since his ‘reelection’6 in 2018, external voting rights
for Venezuelans have suffered various arbitrary barriers—in
addition to the eligibility restrictions defined by law—namely a
lack of information on voting procedures, tight deadlines for
registration, a reduced number of extraterritorial polling stations
(e.g., closing the diplomatic office in Miami), and diplomatic
authorities’ unwillingness to change electoral domicile (from
Venezuela to the residence country) (Umpierrez de Reguero
et al., 2020; VE1; VE2). Indeed, the 2018 Presidential Elections






















Only identity card (not passport) Only identity card and a valid residence visa (not passport)




Precondition for voting (if
eligible)
Once in-person at a diplomatic office
Days to register Up to 3 months before elections
# Of countries/polling
stations
Unspecified Unspecified/116 63/115 81/124 85/126 Unspecified
Voting method In-person (at designated polling stations)
Source: CNE (2020).
6Nicolás Maduro became president with the lowest rate of participation (46.02%) in
decades, with only 8.6 million people from 20 million Venezuelans able to vote
(BBC Mundo, 2018).
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serves as an unambiguous example verifying the restrictive effects
of de facto emigrant enfranchisement. As of the beginning of
2021, nonresident nationals number, almost six million, due to
the Venezuelan exodus (R4V, 2021), and only about 110,000
could and/or were registered to vote in the last election [Electoral
National Council of Venezuela CNE, (2020)].
As Venezuelan de facto emigrant enfranchisement favored
opposition groups, it has become more complex over time.
According to the Electoral Law, Venezuelans abroad can only
cast their vote in-person at any diplomatic office; as many have
fled the country, they failed to update their legal documents
(especially birth certificates and criminal background checks,
which must be issued by the Venezuelan government) to
establish a legal status in the residence country (Freier and
Parent, 2018; Acosta et al., 2019; Umpierrez de Reguero et al.,
2020).
The reform has tended to eliminate the possibility for
certain emigrants to qualify as voters if they live abroad
only temporarily or in transit, as it has been the case for
many undocumented Venezuelans whose access may be
completely denied. Restrictions stemming from registration
requirements or procedures appear to be just as important as
restraints on access and eligibility. When access requirements
may be more inclusive to cast a vote, voting is significantly
constrained by the preceding registration procedures (see
Table 7).
Other (documented) Venezuelans have expressed their desire
to avoid any interactions with diplomatic personnel, given their
notable connection to Nicolas Maduro’s government, particularly
from his ‘reelection’ in 2018. As Buxton (2018) pinpointed, the
ruling regime is heavily supported by the armed forces, as to
maintain state administration composed by active and retired
military. Therefore, the emigrants’ dislike and mistrust toward
offices abroad and their diplomatic personnel are justified, as one
of our respondents admitted, “we are even scared to go to the
embassy and give our name and sign up and the whole thing,
because we feel like all of that is controlled by the
government” (VE3).
The second issue is that elections in Venezuela are not always
free and fair (particularly the last one of 2018), and the field of
political competition is uneven, tipped in favor of the incumbent’s
political coalition (Buxton, 2018; Coppedge et al., 2020). Among
the reduced number of Venezuelans able to register abroad, even
fewer are willing to vote because of the fraudulent and
undemocratic context of Venezuelan elections.
In the 2018 Presidential Elections, the Bureau of Democratic
Unity (la Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, MUD), the most
important coalition of opposition political parties in the country,
decided that no opposition candidate would run in those elections
and started a campaign against electoral participation in response
to the lack of transparency in the process. However, if one takes
the results of 2013 Presidential Elections, opposition leader
Capriles lost the elections by a minimum difference of 141,385
votes against incumbent Maduro—it is to say that if more
Venezuelans abroad would have been registered to vote,
nonresident citizens’ voter turnout could have swung the
electoral results.
In sum, if electoral procedures such as registration abroad and
the requirement of legal residency were to change, the number of
voters abroad would increase and could even play a decisive role
in electoral results, most likely favoring the opposition.
Nevertheless, in practice, the difficulties for registration at
Venezuelan diplomatic offices have led to a tiny number of
voters (reaching only about 3% of the population abroad being
eligible to vote) and the low number of registered voters means
less chance an opposition party could win an election.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we examined the relation between political
regimes and external voting rights. Our dependent variables
comprised de jure and de facto emigrant enfranchisement,
while our main explanatory factor was structured from a
four-value variable of political regimes: liberal and electoral
democracies as well as electoral and closed autocracies. First, we
ran a set of Cox Hazard Proportional models, which
contributed to identifying whether democracy is a driver of
emigrant enfranchisement. Second, using most-different cases,
we unpacked how and why the deviant country cases of Ireland,
Uruguay, Turkey, and Venezuela behave differently than
expected. We delved into state-led motivations and
mesolevel mechanisms that lie behind these country outliers.
For the first component, we used a global longitudinal dataset,
whereas for the second we conducted and analyzed interviews,
official documents, and secondary sources.
Our findings report a positive correlation between
democracy and external voting rights: higher levels of
inclusion and party competition mean higher probabilities of
adopting and implementing the voting franchise for
nonresident citizens. The deviant liberal democracies under
study, Ireland and Uruguay, demonstrated that in certain
contexts with a relatively large diaspora size, and where part
of the political spectrum is doubtful about nonresident citizens’
political orientations, states may deem it better not to grant de
jure or de facto emigrant enfranchisement. Political elites, even
resident nationals, feel no need to change the status quo and
thus continue withholding nonresident citizen voting. The
electoral autocracies under analysis, Turkey and Venezuela,
showed that once external voting rights are enacted, states
considered it more ideal to calibrate the intensity and leverage
of this suffrage, depending on the benefits that the incumbents
could gain from nonresident citizens. When the diaspora favors
(or is perceived to favor) the incumbency, then external voting
rights are extended; otherwise, they are restricted or limited for
nonresident citizens.
We encourage scholars interested in the relation between
emigrant enfranchisement and political regimes to expand
systematic comparisons over time. One case study of interest,
Croatia, could hold another mechanism overlooked in this article.
Croatia was an electoral autocracy when it granted emigrant
enfranchisement but is now a liberal democracy, possibly offering
further refinement to the window-of-opportunity hypothesis.
Scholars also need to increase the dialogue between those
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involved in exploring authoritarianization and external voting
rights and those interested in the window-of-opportunity and
norms diffusion hypotheses, to explain how and why states
enfranchise nonresident citizens. Moreover, we invite scholars
and practitioners to replicate or refine our theoretical appraisal in
other autocracies, such as Angola and Nicaragua, that enacted
provisions for emigrant enfranchisement but have failed to
regulate and apply them.
Looking to electoral autocracies that still implement external voting
rights, disenfranchisement would be a contrasting scenario for future
research. As the regime transition from democracy to autocracy is a
reality in some country cases such as Venezuela, there is an
opportunity to delineate future guidelines for scholars interested in
authoritarian endurance and disenfranchisement processes.
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